HNLMS De Ruyter (1935)
5°58′55″S 112°3′57″E / 5.98194°S 112.06583°E
_(2158_007556).jpg) HNLMS De Ruyter
| |
| Class overview | |
|---|---|
| Builders | Wilton-Fijenoord, Schiedam |
| Operators |  Royal Netherlands Navy |
| Preceded by | Java class |
| Succeeded by | De Zeven Provinciën class |
| Planned | 1 |
| Completed | 1 |
| Lost | 1 |
| History | |
 Netherlands | |
| Name | De Ruyter |
| Laid down | 16 September 1933 |
| Launched | 11 March 1935 |
| Commissioned | 3 October 1936 |
| Fate | Sunk by heavy cruiser Haguro at battle of the Java Sea, February 27–28, 1942. Later illegally salvaged. |
| General characteristics | |
| Type | Light cruiser |
| Displacement |
|
| Length | 170.9 m (560 ft 8 in) |
| Beam | 15.7 m (51 ft 6 in) |
| Draft | 5.1 m (16 ft 9 in) |
| Installed power | 66,000 shp (49,000 kW) |
| Propulsion |
|
| Speed | 32 kn (59 km/h; 37 mph) |
| Range | 6,800 nmi (12,600 km; 7,800 mi) at 12 kn (22 km/h; 14 mph) |
| Complement | 435 max |
| Armament |
|
| Armor | |
| Aircraft carried | 2 × Fokker C-11W floatplanes |
| Aviation facilities | 1 × catapult |
| Notes | All of the above are from this references:[1][2] |
HNLMS De Ruyter was a unique light cruiser of the Royal Netherlands Navy. Intended to reinforce the older Java-class cruisers in the Dutch East Indies, her design and construction was limited by the Great Depression. Laid down in 1933 and commissioned in 1936, she spent the first part of her career patrolling nearby waters prior to the Dutch decleration of war on Japan. During the Dutch East Indies campaign, she became the flagship of the ABDA Combined Strike Fleet. For the first several months of war, she lead allied warships in unsuccessful attempts to intercept Japanese invasions and withstood multiple air attacks. During the Battle of the Java Sea, the cruiser was ambushed by a night-time torpedo attack by Haguro and sunk with most of her crew. Her wreck was later illegally salvaged for metal in the 2010s, which destroyed most of the ship.
Development
[edit]During the Interwar period, the Dutch Navy was split between defending the Netherlands and the Dutch East Indies, particularly the island of Java. While the European fleet focused around minelaying, the flotilla in Asia relied on a combination of aircraft, destroyers, and submarines to identify and destroy an invading force near the coastline. Cruisers were vital in this doctrine, as they had the capability to sail out to sea and attack enemy convoys outside the Indonesian archipelago and serve as powerful escorts for allied vessels.[3]: 73–74
By 1927, the Great Depression had sapped the budget and strength of the Dutch military. Recognizing the need for post-depression rebuilding, the Navy proposed the Vlootplan Deckers (Deckers Fleet Plan) in 1930 to expand the East Indies fleet to a satisfactory size. The plan called for a force of three cruisers. While two Java-class cruisers were already in service, regular maintenance meant that both could not always be available for combat. To ensure that two cruisers could be operational simultaneously, the plan called for the construction of a new cruiser to join the Java-class in the East Indies.[3]: 73–74 [4]: 16–17, [14]
Budgetary constraints
[edit]The Dutch economy was recovering when design work on the new cruiser began, which limited how much theTweede Kamer was willing to budget. The ship's design was based on the earlier Java-class and replicated many of its features, including similar armor protection, range, and the caliber of the main guns. However, budgetary constraints required a lighter hull than the Javas, restricting the main battery to just three twin 15 cm (5.9 in) turrets. This reduction in firepower drew considerable criticism. Some advocated for a fourth turret, the addition of torpedo tubes, or argued that the funds would be better spent on aircraft or submarines.[5]: 75 [6]: 10, 20
Further objections emerged through an essay contest, in which several winning entries proposed building a treaty cruiser armed with 8 in (20 cm) guns and displacing 8,500 long tons (8,636 t). However, the proposal was rejected, as it would have nearly doubled the projected cost. Some of the criticisms were addressed through political maneuvering: by classifying the ship as a flottieljeleider (flotilla leader), the Navy justified a modest increase in displacement, which allowed for the addition of a single 15 cm gun mounted forward of the bridge.[5]: 75 [6]: 20
Design
[edit]
Her final design displaced 7,822 long tons (7,948 t) and measured 170.8 m (560 ft) in length, with a beam of 15.6 m (51 ft) and a draft of 4.9 m (16 ft). Her main armament consisted of three 15 cm (5.9 in) Wilton-Fijenoord Mk 9 twin turrets - two mounted aft and one forward - along with the aformentioned single 15 cm Mk 10 turret. For anti-aircraft defense, she was equipped with five twin 40 mm (1.6 in) Bofors L/60 guns mounted on a platform at the stern. She was the first vessel to be outfitted with the immensely popular L/60, and combined with her advanced anti-aircraft fire control, she was a capable warship for air defense. The platform was separated from the funnel by the Navy’s first catapult and a aircraft stowage area, which supported two Fokker C.XI-W floatplanes used for reconnaissance and artillery spotting. Powered by six boilers and three geared turbines, the cruiser produced 68,000 shaft horsepower (51,000 kilowatts), which drove two propellers and reached a top speed of 32 knots (59 km/h; 37 mph). Her armor was light, consisting of an armored belt and turret protection that was between 30–50 mm (1–2 in) mm thick along with 30 mm (1 in) around the conning tower and a 33 mm (1 in) thick deck. [6]: 18–19
Her designer was N.V. Ingenieurskantoor voor Scheepsbouw (IsV), a clandestine front for several German naval companies used for Nazi rearmament and illegal submarine development. As a result, the ship reflected a strong German influence, seen in features such as the tall, bulky bridge tower, single large funnel, and straight bow shared with Germany’s Deutschland-class cruisers and other characteristics that paralleled those of the Königsberg-class light cruisers. The reliance on German experience constrained the design as the German warships were limited by the Treaty of Versailles, thereby indirectly applying the treaty's limitations to the Dutch ship.[6]: 20–21, [12, 18]
Due to this German influence and tight fiscal limitations, the cruiser has drawn criticism from both contemporary and modern analysts. Compared to other light cruisers built during the same decade, she lacked in armament, armor, and had no torpedo tubes.[6]: 18–19 Her anti-air weapons, while formidable, were grouped together on the aft platform which prevented them from firing forward and provided an opportunity for a lucky shot to destroy them all. In addition, she was designed to serve as a flagship yet lacked a flagship bridge. Her use of two propellers - instead of four, which was the norm - meant she had no redundancies in case the rudder or propeller was damaged; if this did occur, she would have been left uncontrollable.[7]: 181
History
[edit]
Construction
[edit]The cruiser was ordered on 1 August 1932, and her keel was laid on 16 September, 1933 at the Wilton-Fijenoord shipyard. Despite continued financial issues, she was launched on 11 May 1936. On 3 October, she was completed and commissioned as De Ruyter, named after 17th-century admiral Michiel de Ruyter.[8]: 192 [5]: 77, 86
Peace time
[edit]For her first several months in service, De Ruyter worked up off the Netherlands before she sailed for the East Indies in Janurary 1937.[8]: 192 In October, she became the flagship of the Dutch East Indies squadron under the command of Admiral Karel Doorman.[5]: 87 Over the next several years, she trained with other ships in the squadron and prepared defenses throughout the colony. Her work in Asia was uninterrupted by the invasion and capitulation of the Netherlands in 1940.[5]: 86-87
Dutch East Indies Campaign
[edit]Following the bombing of Pearl Harbor and Japanese attacks on British Malaya, the Dutch government-in-exile declared war on Japan on 8 December 1941.[4]: 37 Now in a warzone, De Ruyter patrolled nearby waters aiming to intercept enemy merchants, contain Japanese cruisers, and escort British reinforcements to Singapore.[8]: 192 Over the next two months, Japan’s rapid advances across Southeast Asia overwhelmed the region’s Allied naval forces. In an effort to coordinate resistance, elements of the Australian, British, Dutch, and American navies formed ABDACOM: an ad hoc command that brought together each nation’s available ships under a (nominally) unified structure. One of ABDACOM’s first steps was the formation of an offensive fleet - the Combined Striking Force - that comprised a mix of American and Dutch cruisers and destroyers. After some debate, command of the fleet was given to Doorman, due to Dutch jurisdiction over the region, his leadership of the Dutch squadron, and his reputation as an uncontroversial figure.[7]: 176–178
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Battle of Makassar Strait
[edit]The Striking Force’s first offensive action was on 4 February 1942. Doorman aimed to intercept the invasion of Makassar City and deny the Japanese control of the Makassar Strait. Without air cover, the fleet was detected by Japanese reconnaissance aircraft.[9] [7]: 182-183 While off the Kangean Islands, more than 50 Nells and Betty bombers attacked the fleet. De Ruyter was unscathed, although the American cruiser Marblehead was crippled and another cruiser, Houston, lost a turret. The air attack forced Doorman to call off the mission.[7]: 183-184, 188-189
Several days later, the fleet attempted to intercept the invasion of Sumatra.[7]: 206-207 A floatplane from De Ruyter found the Japanese invasion fleet, and the Allies were likewise detected. Without air support, the fleet was molested by Japanese bombers throughout Valentine's Day; in one instance, a wave of torpedo bombers attacked De Ruyter, mistaking her for a battleship. Miraculously, no ships in the fleet were hit. Nevertheless, Doorman again ordered a retreat.[7]: 209–211
Battle of Badung Strait
[edit]Japan’s next target was Bali. The Allies knew that the fall of Bali would directly threaten ABDA’s bases on Java, and that an immediate response was needed.[7]: 224 A force to counterattack was assembled, but due to time constraints, the Allies were unable to coordinate a unified strike. Instead, the operation was planned in several waves. The first wave was led by De Ruyter, along with Java and several destroyers. The plan was for the two cruisers to sail by at night and attack the invasion force’s escorts and draw them away. This would leave the transports vulnerable to a follow-up attack by Allied destroyers.[7]: 227–229, [226]
On the night of 19 February, the battle began when De Ruyter found the destroyers Asashio and Ōshio escorting a transport off Bali. After catching the Japanese by surprise, De Ruyter opened fire. However, limited communication and poor visibility prevented the ships from hitting each other. After ten minutes, Doorman believed that the destroyers were sufficiently damaged and took the cruisers north and hoped that he was followed.[7]: 230–232 The Japanese did not take the bait. Instead, they then engaged the Allied destroyers, routing them and sinking the Dutch destroyer Piet Hein in the process.[7]: 233
Battle of the Java Sea
[edit].jpg)
On the 26th, the Allies learned that the invasion of Java was underway. Doorman intended to use everything at his disposal to repel the assault, and was reinforced by units from the Royal Navy and Royal Australian Navy.[10] The enlarged fleet, comprised of five cruisers and nine destroyers from four nations, was led by De Ruyter as it moved to intercept the Japanese forces off Java. Contact was made in the mid-afternoon, and the two fleets engaged at long range. The distance made accurate gunnery difficult: De Ruyter’s salvos all missed, though she was struck by a dud shell that caused negligible damage.[11]: 83–84, [80]
About 20 minutes into the battle, the Japanese fleet launched a large salvo of Type 93 torpedoes and hoped the Allied fleet would not expect such an attack from such an extreme range. The only hit was to the destroyer Kortenaer, which promptly sank. The gunnery duel continued: HMS Exeter was struck in her boiler room, cutting her speed to 11 knots (20 km/h; 13 mph). As Exeter turned to withdraw and avoid colliding with the ships behind her, the trailing cruisers followed suit, mistakenly believing an order had been given by De Ruyter. Doorman then desperately had his now-isolated cruiser reform the battle line and ordered several destroyers to make torpedo attacks as cover.[11]: 84, 86
Once reunited, he then broke off from the engagement and pressed on to circle around the Japanese and intercept the transports north of him.[11]: 89 The force was now reduced to the cruisers De Ruyter, Java, Houston, and Perth. The destroyers had either been sunk, severely damaged, tasked with escorting the crippled Exeter, or forced to break off due to lack of fuel and torpedoes.[11]: 89, 92, 96
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Sinking
[edit]The cruisers were temporarily followed by Japanese floatplanes, which gave the Japanese an understanding of his route. Unaware, the Allied cruisers passed near the invasion force but were ambushed by the Japanese heavy cruisers Haguro and Nachi. Under cover of darkness, the Japanese closed to 9,000 yards (8,200 m) undetected and fired a spread of torpedoes followed by a renewed gun duel. The fleet took evasive action, but one torpedo from Nachi struck Java’s magazine that obliterated the old cruiser.[7]: 314-317
Doorman believed the torpedoes had all passed and resumed course, which placed De Ruyter directly in the path of another spread, this time from Haguro. A torpedo struck her stern near the reduction gears with devastating effect. Power was lost, oil spilled from a ruptured tank, and fire engulfed her aft section. As the fire spread to the anti-aircraft platform, the 40mm ammunition began to cook off while damage control teams struggled to respond. Without electrical power, fire hoses and pumps were inoperable while the burning dynamo generators had to be extinguished for power to be restored. One of the last orders from the cruiser was to order the two remaining ships to flee.[7]: 318-320
The order to abandon ship was given among more secondary explosions. The wounded were prioritized and placed into the only boat that could deploy without electricity. Doorman and De Ruyter's captain, Eugène Lacomblé, were determined to go down with the ship. While their exact fate is unclear, one sailor saw the two retreat to a cabin where they presumably killed themselves.[7]: 323 A total of 344 crew members - roughly 80% of the ship’s complement - died, many from the anti-air ammunition explosions or the floating oil fires.[11]: 96–97 [5]: 95
Wreck
[edit]The wreck of De Ruyter was discovered by specialist wreck divers on 1 December 2002 and declared a war grave, with the ship's two bells—one now in the Kloosterkerk in the Hague—being recovered. The wreck of HNLMS Java was also found on the same day by the same divers, which then found HNLMS Kortenaer on 12 August 2004.[12]
In 2016, the whole wrecks of De Ruyter and Java, as well much of Kortenaer, were found to have disappeared from the seabed, although their imprints on the ocean floor remained. Over 100 ships and submarines of various countries sank during the war in the seas around Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia; many are designated as war graves. There is known to be illegal scavenging of these wrecks, often using explosives; the Netherlands Defence Ministry suggested that De Ruyter, Java, and Kortenaer may have been illegally salvaged.[13] In February 2017, a report was issued confirming the illegal salvaging of the three wrecks.[14][15]
According to Indonesian journalist Aqwam Hanifan, the remains of Dutch sailors on De Ruyter and the other illegally salvaged ships were dumped in a mass grave in East Java.[16]
Further reading
[edit]- Legemaate, H J (1999). Hr. Ms. Kruiser 'De Ruyter' 1933-1942 [Her Majesty's Cruiser 'De Ruyter' 1933-1942] (in Dutch). Asia Maior. ISBN 9789074861151.
- Brzezinski, Slawomir (2006). Holenderski lekki krazownik De Ruyter [The Netherlands Light Cruiser De Ruyter (1942)] (in pl/en). Profile Morskie. ISBN 838791889X.
{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: unrecognized language (link)
References
[edit]- ^ "Technische gegevens Hr.Ms. De Ruyter". TracesOfWar.com.
- ^ "Lichte kruiser Hr.Ms. De Ruyter". Jaime Karreman.
- ^ a b van Oosten, F. C. (1 January 1974). Warship Profile 40: Her Netherlands Majesty's Ship De Ruyter. Profile Publications. ASIN B0007C1ABY. ISBN 9780853830627.
- ^ a b Noppen, Ryan K. (2020). The Royal Netherlands Navy of World War II. New Vanguard Series. Paul Wright (1st ed.). London: Bloomsbury Publishing Plc. ISBN 978-1-4728-4191-9.
- ^ a b c d e f van Oosten, F. C. (1 January 1974). Warship Profile 40: Her Netherlands Majesty's Ship De Ruyter. Profile Publications. ASIN B0007C1ABY. ISBN 9780853830627.
- ^ a b c d e Noppen, Ryan K. (2020). The Royal Netherlands Navy of World War II. New Vanguard Series. Paul Wright (1st ed.). London: Bloomsbury Publishing Plc. ISBN 978-1-4728-4191-9.
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m Cox, Jeffrey (2014). Rising Sun, Falling Skies: The Disastrous Java Sea Campaign of World War II. General Military. London: Bloomsbury Publishing Plc. ISBN 978-1-4728-1060-1.
- ^ a b c Whitley, M. J. (Michael J. ) (1995). Cruisers of World War Two : an international encyclopedia. London : Arms and Armour Press. ISBN 978-1-85409-225-0.
{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: publisher location (link) - ^ "1942: February 4: Battle of Makassar Strait". National Museum of the U.S. Navy. Retrieved 2025-04-10.
- ^ "BBC - WW2 People's War - Timeline Fact File : Battle of Java Sea". www.bbc.co.uk. Archived from the original on 17 December 2024. Retrieved 2025-04-13.
- ^ a b c d e Stille, Mark (26 November 2019). Java Sea 1942: Japan's conquest of the Netherlands East Indies (Online ed.). Osprey Publishing. ISBN 978-1472831613.
- ^ PacificWrecks.com. "Kevin Denlay - Shipwreck Explorer and SCUBA Diver". Pacific Wrecks. Retrieved 2019-01-22.
- ^ Oliver Holmes and agencies (16 November 2016). "Mystery as wrecks of three Dutch WWII ships vanish from Java seabed". The Guardian. Retrieved 16 November 2016.
- ^ "Report verification mission" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on 2017-04-15. Retrieved 2017-04-15.
- ^ Hoare, James (23 November 2016). "Java Sea Shipwrecks of World War 2: One of the men who found them reflects on their loss | All About History". Historyanswers.co.uk. Retrieved 2019-01-22.
- ^ Boffey, Daniel (January 22, 2018). "Bodies of second world war sailors in Java sea 'dumped in mass grave'". theguardian.com. Retrieved October 28, 2022.
External links
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